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Abstract
In federated learning, multiple client devices jointly learn a
machine learning model: each client device maintains a local
model for its local training dataset, while a master device
maintains a global model via aggregating the local models
from the client devices. The machine learning community
recently proposed several federated learning methods that
were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures (e.g.,
system failures, adversarial manipulations) of certain client
devices. In this work, we perform the first systematic study
on local model poisoning attacks to federated learning. We
assume an attacker has compromised some client devices,
and the attacker manipulates the local model parameters on
the compromised client devices during the learning process
such that the global model has a large testing error rate. We
formulate our attacks as optimization problems and apply
our attacks to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning
methods. Our empirical results on four real-world datasets
show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates
of the models learnt by the federated learning methods that
were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures of some
client devices. We generalize two defenses for data poisoning
attacks to defend against our local model poisoning attacks.
Our evaluation results show that one defense can effectively
defend against our attacks in some cases, but the defenses are
not effective enough in other cases, highlighting the need for
new defenses against our local model poisoning attacks to
federated learning.
1 Introduction
Byzantine-robust federated learning: In federated learn-
ing (also known as collaborative learning) [32, 39], the
training dataset is decentralized among multiple client de-
vices (e.g., desktops, mobile phones, IoT devices), which
could belong to different users or organizations. These
users/organizations do not want to share their local training
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Figure 1: Data vs. local model poisoning attacks.
datasets, but still desire to jointly learn a model. For instance,
multiple hospitals may desire to learn a healthcare model
without sharing their sensitive data to each other. Each client
device (called worker device) maintains a local model for its
local training dataset. Moreover, the service provider has a
master device (e.g., cloud server), which maintains a global
model. Roughly speaking, federated learning repeatedly per-
forms three steps: the master device sends the current global
model to worker devices; worker devices update their local
models using their local training datasets and the global model,
and send the local models to the master device; and the master
device computes a new global model via aggregating the local
models according to a certain aggregation rule.
For instance, the mean aggregation rule that takes the aver-
age of the local model parameters as the global model is
widely used under non-adversarial settings. However, the
global model can be arbitrarily manipulated for mean even
if just one worker device is compromised [9, 66]. Therefore,
the machine learning community recently proposed multi-
ple aggregation rules (e.g., Krum [9], Bulyan [42], trimmed
mean [66], and median [66]), which aimed to be robust against
Byzantine failures of certain worker devices.
Existing data poisoning attacks are insufficient: We con-
sider attacks that aim to manipulate the training phase of
machine learning such that the learnt model (we consider the
model to be a classifier) has a high testing error rate indiscrim-
inately for testing examples, which makes the model unusable
and eventually leads to denial-of-service attacks. Figure 1
shows the training phase, which includes two components,
i.e., training dataset collection and learning process. The
training dataset collection component is to collect a training
dataset, while the learning process component produces a
model from a given training dataset. Existing attacks mainly
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inject malicious data into the training dataset before the learn-
ing process starts, while the learning process is assumed to
maintain integrity. Therefore, these attacks are often called
data poisoning attacks [8, 30, 33, 50, 56, 62]. In federated
learning, an attacker could only inject the malicious data into
the worker devices that are under the attacker’s control. As
a result, these data poisoning attacks have limited success to
attack Byzantine-robust federated learning (see our experi-
mental results in Section 4.4).
Our work: We perform the first study on local model poison-
ing attacks to Byzantine-robust federated learning. Existing
studies [9, 66] only showed local model poisoning attacks to
federated learning with the non-robust mean aggregation rule.
Threat model. Unlike existing data poisoning attacks that
compromise the integrity of training dataset collection, we
aim to compromise the integrity of the learning process in
the training phase (see Figure 1). We assume the attacker
has control of some worker devices and manipulates the local
model parameters sent from these devices to the master device
during the learning process. The attacker may or may not
know the aggregation rule used by the master device. To
contrast with data poisoning attacks, we call our attacks local
model poisoning attacks as they directly manipulate the local
model parameters.
Local model poisoning attacks. A key challenge of local
model poisoning attacks is how to craft the local models
sent from the compromised worker devices to the master
device. To address this challenge, we formulate crafting local
models as solving an optimization problem in each iteration
of federated learning. Specifically, the master device could
compute a global model in an iteration if there are no attacks,
which we call before-attack global model. Our goal is to craft
the local models on the compromised worker devices such that
the global model deviates the most towards the inverse of the
direction along which the before-attack global model would
change. Our intuition is that the deviations accumulated over
multiple iterations would make the learnt global model differ
from the before-attack one significantly. We apply our attacks
to four recent Byzantine-robust federated learning methods
including Krum, Bulyan, trimmed mean, and median.
Our evaluation results on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, CH-
MNIST, and Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic) datasets
show that our attacks can substantially increase the error rates
of the global models under various settings of federated learn-
ing. For instance, when learning a deep neural network clas-
sifier for MNIST using Krum, our attack can increase the
error rate from 0.11 to 0.75. Moreover, we compare with data
poisoning attacks including label flipping attacks and back-
gradient optimization based attacks [43] (state-of-the-art un-
targeted data poisoning attacks for multi-class classifiers),
which poison the local training datasets on the compromised
worker devices. We find that these data poisoning attacks
have limited success to attack the Byzantine-robust federated
learning methods.
Defenses. Existing defenses against data poisoning attacks
essentially aim to sanitize the training dataset. One category
of defenses [4, 15, 56, 59] detects malicious data based on
their negative impact on the error rate of the learnt model. For
instance, Reject on Negative Impact (RONI) [4] measures the
impact of each training example on the error rate of the learnt
model and removes the training examples that have large
negative impact. Another category of defenses [20, 30, 35]
leverages new loss functions, solving which detects malicious
data and learns a model simultaneously. For instance, Jagielski
et al. [30] proposed TRIM, which aims to jointly find a subset
of training dataset with a given size and model parameters that
minimize the loss function. The training examples that are not
in the selected subset are treated as malicious data. However,
these defenses are not directly applicable for our local model
poisoning attacks because our attacks do not inject malicious
data into the training dataset.
To address the challenge, we generalize RONI and TRIM
to defend against our local model poisoning attacks. Both de-
fenses remove the local models that are potentially malicious
before computing the global model using a Byzantine-robust
aggregation rule in each iteration. One defense removes the
local models that have large negative impact on the error rate
of the global model (inspired by RONI that removes training
examples that have large negative impact on the error rate of
the model), while the other defense removes the local models
that result in large loss (inspired by TRIM that removes the
training examples that have large negative impact on the loss),
where the error rate and loss are evaluated on a validation
dataset. We call the two defenses Error Rate based Rejection
(ERR) and Loss Function based Rejection (LFR), respectively.
Moreover, we combine ERR and LFR, i.e., we remove the
local models that are removed by either ERR or LFR. Our
empirical evaluation results show that LFR outperforms ERR;
and the combined defense is comparable to LFR in most
cases. Moreover, LFR can defend against our attacks in cer-
tain cases, but LFR is not effective enough in other cases. For
instance, LFR can effectively defend against our attacks that
craft local models based on the trimmed mean aggregation
rule, but LFR is not effective against our attacks that are based
on the Krum aggregation rule. Our results show that we need
new defense mechanisms to defend against our local model
poisoning attacks.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We perform the first systematic study on attacking
Byzantine-robust federated learning.
• We propose local model poisoning attacks to Byzantine-
robust federated learning. Our attacks manipulate the
local model parameters on compromised worker de-
vices during the learning process.
• We generalize two defenses for data poisoning attacks
to defend against local model poisoning attacks. Our
results show that, although one of them is effective in
some cases, they have limited success in other cases.
2 Background and Problem Formulation
2.1 Federated Learning
Suppose we have m worker devices and the ith worker device
has a local training dataset Di. The worker devices aim to
collaboratively learn a classifier. Specifically, the model pa-
rameters w of the classifier are often obtained via solving the
following optimization problem: minw∑mi=1 F(w,Di), where
F(w,Di) is the objective function for the local training dataset
on the ith device and characterizes how well the parameters
w model the local training dataset on the ith device. Differ-
ent classifiers (e.g., logistic regression, deep neural networks)
use different objective functions. In federated learning, each
worker device maintains a local model for its local training
dataset. Moreover, we have a master device to maintain a
global model via aggregating local models from the m worker
devices. Specifically, federated learning performs the follow-
ing three steps in each iteration:
Step I. The master device sends the current global model
parameters to all worker devices.
Step II. The worker devices update their local model pa-
rameters using the current global model parameters and their
local training datasets in parallel. In particular, the ith worker
device essentially aims to solve the optimization problem
minwi F(wi,Di) with the global model parameters w as an
initialization of the local model parameters wi. A worker de-
vice could use any method to solve the optimization problem,
though stochastic gradient descent is the most popular one.
Specifically, the ith worker device updates its local model
parameters wi as wi = w−α · ∂F(w,Bi)∂w , where α is the learn-
ing rate and Bi is a randomly sampled batch from the local
training dataset Di. Note that a worker device could apply
stochastic gradient descent multiple rounds to update its local
model. After updating the local models, the worker devices
send them to the master device.
Step III. The master device aggregates the local models
from the worker devices to obtain a new global model ac-
cording to a certain aggregation rule. Formally, we have
w = A(w1,w2, · · · ,wm).
The master device could also randomly pick a subset of
worker devices and send the global model to them; the picked
worker devices update their local models and send them to
the master device; and the master device aggregates the local
models to obtain the new global model [39]. We note that,
for the aggregation rules we study in this paper, sending local
models to the master device is equivalent to sending gradients
to the master device, who aggregates the gradients and uses
them to update the global model.
2.2 Byzantine-robust Aggregation Rules
A naive aggregation rule is to average the local model param-
eters as the global model parameters. This mean aggregation
rule is widely used under non-adversarial settings [16, 32, 39].
However, mean is not robust under adversarial settings. In
particular, an attacker can manipulate the global model param-
eters arbitrarily for this mean aggregation rule when compro-
mising only one worker device [9,66]. Therefore, the machine
learning community has recently developed multiple aggrega-
tion rules that aim to be robust even if certain worker devices
exhibit Byzantine failures. Next, we review several such ag-
gregation rules.
Krum [9] and Bulyan [42]: Krum selects one of the m local
models that is similar to other models as the global model.
The intuition is that even if the selected local model is from a
compromised worker device, its impact may be constrained
since it is similar to other local models possibly from be-
nign worker devices. Suppose at most c worker devices are
compromised. For each local model wi, the master device
computes the m− c− 2 local models that are the closest to
wi with respect to Euclidean distance. Moreover, the master
device computes the sum of the distances between wi and its
closest m− c−2 local models. Krum selects the local model
with the smallest sum of distance as the global model. When
c< m−22 , Krum has theoretical guarantees for the convergence
for certain objective functions.
Euclidean distance between two local models could be
substantially influenced by a single model parameter. There-
fore, Krum could be influenced by some abnormal model
parameters [42]. To address this issue, Mhamdi et al. [42]
proposed Bulyan, which essentially combines Krum and a
variant of trimmed mean (trimmed mean will be discussed
next). Specifically, Bulyan first iteratively applies Krum to se-
lect θ (θ≤m−2c) local models. Then, Bulyan uses a variant
of trimmed mean to aggregate the θ local models. In particular,
for each jth model parameter, Bulyan sorts the jth parameters
of the θ local models, finds the γ (γ≤ θ−2c) parameters that
are the closest to the median, and computes their mean as the
jth parameter of the global model. When c ≤ m−34 , Bulyan
has theoretical guarantees for the convergence under certain
assumptions of the objective function.
Since Bulyan is based on Krum, our attacks for Krum can
transfer to Bulyan (see Appendix A). Moreover, Bulyan is
not scalable because it executes Krum many times in each
iteration and Krum computes pairwise distances between
local models. Therefore, we will focus on Krum in the paper.
Trimmed mean [66]: This aggregation rule aggregates each
model parameter independently. Specifically, for each jth
model parameter, the master device sorts the jth parameters
of the m local models, i.e., w1 j,w2 j, · · · ,wm j, where wi j is the
jth parameter of the ith local model, removes the largest and
smallest β of them, and computes the mean of the remaining
m−2β parameters as the jth parameter of the global model.
Suppose at most c worker devices are compromised. This
trimmed mean aggregation rule achieves order-optimal error
rate when c ≤ β < m2 and the objective function to be mini-
mized is strongly convex. Specifically, the order-optimal error
rate is O˜( cm√n +
1√
mn ),
1 where n is the number of training
data points on a worker device (worker devices are assumed
to have the same number of training data points).
Median [66]: In this median aggregation rule, for each jth
model parameter, the master device sorts the jth parameters of
the m local models and takes the median as the jth parameter
of the global model. Note that when m is an even number,
median is the mean of the middle two parameters. Like the
trimmed mean aggregation rule, the median aggregation rule
also achieves an order-optimal error rate when the objective
function is strongly convex.
2.3 Problem Definition and Threat Model
Attacker’s goal: Like many studies on poisoning attacks [7,
8, 30, 33, 50, 62, 65], we consider an attacker’s goal is to ma-
nipulate the learnt global model such that it has a high error
rate indiscriminately for testing examples. Such attacks are
known as untargeted poisoning attacks, which make the learnt
model unusable and eventually lead to denial-of-service at-
tacks. For instance, an attacker may perform such attacks to
its competitor’s federated learning system. Some studies also
considered other types of poisoning attacks (e.g., targeted
poisoning attacks [56]), which we will review in Section 6.
We note that the Byzantine-robust aggregation rules dis-
cussed above can asymptotically bound the error rates of the
learnt global model under certain assumptions of the objec-
tive functions, and some of them (i.e., trimmed mean and
median) even achieve order-optimal error rates. These theo-
retical guarantees seem to imply the difficulty of manipulating
the error rates. However, the asymptotic guarantees do not
precisely characterize the practical performance of the learnt
models. Specifically, the asymptotic error rates are quantified
using the O˜ notation. The O˜ notation ignores any constant,
e.g., O˜( 1√n )=O˜(
100√
n ). However, such constant significantly in-
fluences a model’s error rate in practice. As we will show,
although these asymptotic error rates still hold for our local
model poisoning attacks since they hold for Byzantine fail-
ures, our attacks can still significantly increase the testing
error rates of the learnt models in practice.
Attacker’s capability: We assume the attacker has control
of c worker devices. Specifically, like Sybil attacks [17] to
distributed systems, the attacker could inject c fake worker
devices into the federated learning system or compromise c
benign worker devices. However, we assume the number of
worker devices under the attacker’s control is less than 50%
(otherwise, it would be easy to manipulate the global models).
We assume the attacker can arbitrarily manipulate the local
models sent from these worker devices to the master device.
For simplicity, we call these worker devices compromised
worker devices no matter whether they are fake devices or
compromised benign ones.
1O˜ is a variant of the O notation, which ignores the logarithmic terms.
Attacker’s background knowledge: The attacker knows
the code, local training datasets, and local models on the
compromised worker devices. We characterize the attacker’s
background knowledge along the following two dimensions:
Aggregation rule. We consider two scenarios depending
on whether the attacker knows the aggregation rule or not.
In particular, the attacker could know the aggregation rule in
various scenarios. For instance, the service provider may make
the aggregation rule public in order to increase transparency
and trust of the federated learning system [39]. When the
attacker does not know the aggregation rule, we will craft
local model parameters for the compromised worker devices
based on a certain aggregation rule. Our empirical results
show that such crafted local models could also attack other
aggregation rules. In particular, we observe different levels of
transferability of our local model poisoning attacks between
different aggregation rules.
Training data. We consider two cases (full knowledge and
partial knowledge) depending on whether the attacker knows
the local training datasets and local models on the benign
worker devices. In the full knowledge scenario, the attacker
knows the local training dataset and local model on every
worker device. We note that the full knowledge scenario has
limited applicability in practice for federated learning as the
training dataset is decentralized on many worker devices, and
we use it to estimate the upper bound of our attacks’ threats for
a given setting of federated learning. In the partial knowledge
scenario, the attacker only knows the local training datasets
and local models on the compromised worker devices.
Our threat model is inspired by multiple existing stud-
ies [30, 47, 48, 56] on adversarial machine learning. For in-
stance, Suciu et al. [56] recently proposed to characterize an
attacker’s background knowledge and capability for data poi-
soning attacks with respect to multiple dimensions such as
Feature, Algorithm, and Instance. Our aggregation rule and
training data dimensions are essentially the Algorithm and
Instance dimensions, respectively. We do not consider the
Feature dimension because the attacker controls some worker
devices and already knows the features in our setting.
Some Byzantine-robust aggregation rules (e.g., Krum [9]
and trimmed mean [66]) need to know the upper bound of the
number of compromised worker devices in order to set pa-
rameters appropriately. For instance, trimmed mean removes
the largest and smallest β local model parameters, where β is
at least the number of compromised worker devices (other-
wise trimmed mean can be easily manipulated). To calculate a
lower bound for our attack’s threat, we consider a hypothetical,
strong service provider who knows the number of compro-
mised worker devices and sets parameters in the aggregation
rule accordingly.
3 Our Local Model Poisoning Attacks
We focus on the case where the aggregation rule is known.
When the aggregation rule is unknown, we craft local models
based on an assumed one. Our empirical results in Section 4.3
show that our attacks have different levels of transferability
between aggregation rules.
3.1 Optimization Problem
Our idea is to manipulate the global model via carefully craft-
ing the local models sent from the compromised worker de-
vices to the master device in each iteration of federated learn-
ing. We denote by s j the changing direction of the jth global
model parameter in the current iteration when there are no
attacks, where s j = 1 or −1. s j = 1 (or s j =−1) means that
the jth global model parameter increases (or decreases) upon
the previous iteration. We consider the attacker’s goal (we
call it directed deviation goal) is to deviate a global model
parameter the most towards the inverse of the direction along
which the global model parameter would change without at-
tacks. Suppose in an iteration, wi is the local model that the ith
worker device intends to send to the master device when there
are no attacks. Without loss of generality, we assume the first
c worker devices are compromised. Our directed deviation
goal is to craft local models w′1,w
′
2, · · · ,w′c for the compro-
mised worker devices via solving the following optimization
problem in each iteration:
max
w′1,··· ,w′c
sT (w−w′),
subject to w = A(w1, · · · ,wc,wc+1, · · · ,wm),
w′ = A(w′1, · · · ,w′c,wc+1, · · · ,wm), (1)
where s is a column vector of the changing directions of
all global model parameters, w is the before-attack global
model, and w′ is the after-attack global model. Note that s, w,
and w′ all depend on the iteration number. Since our attacks
manipulate the local models in each iteration, we omit the
explicit dependency on the iteration number for simplicity.
In our preliminary exploration of formulating poisoning
attacks, we also considered a deviation goal, which does not
consider the global model parameters’ changing directions.
We empirically find that our attacks based on both the directed
deviation goal and the deviation goal achieve high testing error
rates for Krum. However, the directed deviation goal substan-
tially outperforms the deviation goal for trimmed mean and
median aggregation rules. Appendix B shows our deviation
goal and the empirical comparisons between deviation goal
and directed deviation goal.
3.2 Attacking Krum
Recall that Krum selects one local model as the global model
in each iteration. Suppose w is the selected local model in
the current iteration when there are no attacks. Our goal is
to craft the c compromised local models such that the local
model selected by Krum has the largest directed deviation
from w. Our idea is to make Krum select a certain crafted
local model (e.g., w′1 without loss of generality) via crafting
the c compromised local models. Therefore, we aim to solve
the optimization problem in Equation 1 with w′ = w′1 and the
aggregation rule is Krum.
Full knowledge: The key challenge of solving the optimiza-
tion problem is that the constraint of the optimization problem
is highly nonlinear and the search space of the local models
w′1, · · · ,w′c is large. To address the challenge, we make two
approximations. Our approximations represent suboptimal
solutions to the optimization problem, which means that the
attacks based on the approximations may have suboptimal
performance. However, as we will demonstrate in our experi-
ments, our attacks already substantially increase the error rate
of the learnt model.
First, we restrict w′1 as follows: w
′
1 = wRe−λs, where wRe
is the global model received from the master device in the cur-
rent iteration (i.e., the global model obtained in the previous
iteration) and λ> 0. This approximation explicitly models the
directed deviation between the crafted local model w′1 and the
received global model. We also explored the approximation
w′1 = w−λs, which means that we explicitly model the di-
rected deviation between the crafted local model and the local
model selected by Krum before attack. However, we found
that our attacks are less effective using this approximation.
Second, to make w1 more likely to be selected by Krum,
we craft the other c−1 compromised local models to be close
to w′1. In particular, when the other c−1 compromised local
models are close to w′1, w
′
1 only needs to have a small distance
to m− 2c− 1 benign local models in order to be selected
by Krum. In other words, the other c−1 compromised local
models “support” the crafted local model w′1. In implementing
our attack, we first assume the other c−1 compromised local
models are the same as w′1, then we solve w
′
1, and finally we
randomly sample c− 1 vectors, whose distance to w′1 is at
most ε, as the other c−1 compromised local models. With our
two approximations, we transform the optimization problem
as follows:
max
λ
λ
subject to w′1 = Krum(w
′
1, · · · ,w′c,w(c+1), · · · ,wm),
w′1 = wRe−λs,
w′i = w
′
1, for i = 2,3, · · · ,c. (2)
More precisely, the objective function in the above opti-
mization problem should be sT (w−wRe)+λsT s. However,
sT (w−wRe) is a constant and sT s = d where d is the number
of parameters in the global model. Therefore, we simplify the
objective function to be just λ. After solving λ in the opti-
mization problem, we can obtain the crafted local model w′1.
Then, we randomly sample c−1 vectors whose distance to
w′1 is at most ε as the other c−1 compromised local models.
We will explore the impact of ε on the effectiveness of our
attacks in experiments.
Solving λ. Solving λ in the optimization problem in Equa-
tion 2 is key to our attacks. First, we derive an upper bound
of the solution λ to the optimization problem. Formally, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose λ is a solution to the optimization prob-
lem in Equation 2. λ is upper bounded as follows:
λ≤ 1
(m−2c−1)√d · minc+1≤i≤m
 ∑
l∈Γ˜m−c−2wi
D(wl ,wi)

+
1√
d
· max
c+1≤i≤m
D(wi,wRe), (3)
where d is the number of parameters in the global model,
D(wl ,wi) is the Euclidean distance between wl and wi,
Γ˜m−c−2wi is the set of m− c−2 benign local models that have
the smallest Euclidean distance to wi.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Given the upper bound, we use a binary search to solve
λ. Specifically, we initialize λ as the upper bound and check
whether Krum selects w′1 as the global model; if not, then
we half λ; we repeat this process until Krum selects w′1 or
λ is smaller than a certain threshold (this indicates that the
optimization problem may not have a solution). In our experi-
ments, we use 1×10−5 as the threshold.
Partial knowledge: In the partial knowledge scenario, the
attacker does not know the local models on the benign worker
devices, i.e., w(c+1), · · · ,wm. As a result, the attacker does
not know the changing directions s and cannot solve the opti-
mization problem in Equation 2. However, the attacker has
access to the before-attack local models on the c compromised
worker devices. Therefore, we propose to craft compromised
local models based on these before-attack local models. First,
we compute the mean of the c before-attack local models as
w˜ = 1c ∑
c
i=1 wi. Second, we estimate the changing directions
using the mean local model. Specifically, if the mean of the
jth parameter is larger than the jth global model parameter
received from the master device in the current iteration, then
we estimate the changing direction for the jth parameter to
be 1, otherwise we estimate it to be −1. For simplicity, we
denote by s˜ the vector of estimated changing directions.
Third, we treat the before-attack local models on the com-
promised worker devices as if they were local models on
benign worker devices, and we aim to craft local model w′1
such that, among the crafted local model and the c before-
attack local models, Krum selects the crafted local model.
Formally, we have the following optimization problem:
max
λ
λ
subject to w′1 = Krum(w
′
1,w1, · · · ,wc),
w′1 = wRe−λs˜. (4)
Similar to Theorem 1, we can also derive an upper bound
of λ for the optimization problem in Equation 4. Moreover,
similar to the full knowledge scenario, we use a binary search
to solve λ. However, unlike the full knowledge scenario, if
we cannot find a solution λ until λ is smaller than a threshold
(i.e., 1× 10−5), then we add one more crafted local model
w′2 such that among the crafted local models w
′
1, w
′
2, and the
c before-attack local models, Krum selects the crafted local
model w′1. Specifically, we solve the optimization problem
in Equation 4 with w′2 added into the Krum aggregation rule.
Like the full knowledge scenario, we assume w′2 = w
′
1. If
we still cannot find a solution λ until λ is smaller than the
threshold, we add another crafted local model. We repeat this
process until finding a solution λ. We find that such iterative
searching process makes our attack more effective for Krum
in the partial knowledge scenario. After solving λ, we obtain
the crafted local model w′1. Then, like the full knowledge
scenario, we randomly sample c−1 vectors whose distance
to w′1 is at most ε as the other c−1 compromised local models.
3.3 Attacking Trimmed Mean
Suppose wi j is the jth before-attack local model parameter on
the ith worker device and w j is the jth before-attack global
model parameter in the current iteration. We discuss how we
craft each local model parameter on the compromised worker
devices. We denote by wmax, j and wmin, j the maximum and
minimum of the jth local model parameters on the benign
worker devices, i.e., wmax, j=max{w(c+1) j,w(c+2) j, · · · ,wm j}
and wmin, j=min{w(c+1) j,w(c+2) j, · · · ,wm j}.
Full knowledge: Theoretically, we can show that the follow-
ing attack can maximize the directed deviations of the global
model (i.e., an optimal solution to the optimization problem
in Equation 1): if s j = −1, then we use any c numbers that
are larger than wmax, j as the jth local model parameters on
the c compromised worker devices, otherwise we use any c
numbers that are smaller than wmin, j as the jth local model
parameters on the c compromised worker devices.
Intuitively, our attack crafts the compromised local models
based on the maximum or minimum benign local model pa-
rameters, depending on which one deviates the global model
towards the inverse of the direction along which the global
model would change without attacks. The sampled c numbers
should be close to wmax, j or wmin, j to avoid being outliers
and being detected easily. Therefore, when implementing
the attack, if s j =−1, then we randomly sample the c num-
bers in the interval [wmax, j,b ·wmax, j] (when wmax, j > 0) or
[wmax, j,wmax, j/b] (when wmax, j ≤ 0), otherwise we randomly
sample the c numbers in the interval [wmin, j/b,wmin, j] (when
wmin, j > 0) or [b ·wmin, j,wmin, j] (when wmin, j ≤ 0). Our attack
does not depend on b once b > 1. In our experiments, we set
b = 2.
Partial knowledge: An attacker faces two challenges in the
partial knowledge scenario. First, the attacker does not know
the changing direction variable s j because the attacker does
not know the local models on the benign worker devices.
Second, for the same reason, the attacker does not know the
maximum wmax, j and minimum wmin, j of the benign local
model parameters. Like Krum, to address the first challenge,
we estimate the changing direction variables using the local
models on the compromised worker devices.
One naive strategy to address the second challenge is to use
a very large number as wmax, j or a very small number as wmin, j.
However, if we craft the compromised local models based on
wmax, j or wmin, j that are far away from their true values, the
crafted local models may be outliers and the master device
may detect the compromised local models easily. Therefore,
we propose to estimate wmax, j and wmin, j using the before-
attack local model parameters on the compromised worker
devices. In particular, the attacker can compute the mean
µ j and standard deviation σ j of each jth parameter on the
compromised worker devices.
Based on the assumption that each jth parameters of the be-
nign worker devices are samples from a Gaussian distribution
with mean µ j and standard deviation σ j, we can estimate that
wmax, j is smaller than µ j + 3σ j or µ j + 4σ j with large prob-
abilities; and wmin, j is larger than µ j−4σ j or µ j−3σ j with
large probabilities. Therefore, when s j is estimated to be −1,
we sample c numbers from the interval [µ j+3σ j,µ j+4σ j] as
the jth parameter of the c compromised local models, which
means that the crafted compromised local model parameters
are larger than the maximum of the benign local model pa-
rameters with a high probability (e.g., 0.898 – 0.998 when
m = 100 and c = 20 under the Gaussian distribution assump-
tion). When s j is estimated to be 1, we sample c numbers from
the interval [µ j− 4σ j,µ j− 3σ j] as the jth parameter of the
c compromised local models, which means that the crafted
compromised local model parameters are smaller than the
minimum of the benign local model parameters with a high
probability. The jth model parameters on the benign worker
devices may not accurately follow a Gaussian distribution.
However, our attacks are still effective empirically.
3.4 Attacking Median
We use the same attacks for trimmed mean to attack the me-
dian aggregation rule. For instance, in the full knowledge
scenario, we randomly sample the c numbers in the inter-
val [wmax, j,b ·wmax, j] or [wmax, j,wmax, j/b] if s j = −1, oth-
erwise we randomly sample the c numbers in the interval
[wmin, j/b,wmin, j] or [b ·wmin, j,wmin, j].
4 Evaluation
We evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks using multiple
datasets in different scenarios, e.g., the impact of different
parameters and known vs. unknown aggregation rules. More-
over, we compare our attacks with existing attacks.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets: We consider four datasets: MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST, CH-MNIST [31]2 and Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Di-
agnostic) [18]. MNIST and Fashion-MNIST each includes
60,000 training examples and 10,000 testing examples, where
each example is an 28×28 grayscale image. Both datasets
are 10-class classification problems. The CH-MNIST dataset
consists of 5000 images of histology tiles from patients with
colorectal cancer. The dataset is an 8-class classification prob-
lem. Each image has 64×64 grayscale pixels. We randomly
select 4000 images as the training examples and use the re-
maining 1000 as the testing examples. The Breast Cancer
Wisconsin (Diagnostic) dataset is a binary classification prob-
lem to diagnose whether a person has breast cancer. The
dataset contains 569 examples, each of which has 30 features
describing the characteristics of a person’s cell nuclei. We
randomly select 455 (80%) examples as the training examples,
and use the remaining 114 examples as the testing examples.
Machine learning classifiers: We consider the following
classifiers.
Multi-class logistic regression (LR). The considered ag-
gregation rules have theoretical guarantees for the error rate
of LR classifier.
Deep neural networks (DNN). For MNIST, Fashion-
MNIST, and Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic), we use a
DNN with the architecture described in Table 7a in Appendix.
We use ResNet20 [28] for CH-MNIST. Our DNN architecture
does not necessarily achieve the smallest error rates for the
considered datasets, as our goal is not to search for the best
DNN architecture. Our goal is to show that our attacks can
increase the testing error rates of the learnt DNN classifiers.
Compared attacks: We compare the following attacks.
Gaussian attack. This attack randomly crafts the local
models on the compromised worker devices. Specifically,
for each jth model parameter, we estimate a Gaussian dis-
tribution using the before-attack local models on all worker
devices. Then, for each compromised worker device, we sam-
ple a number from the Gaussian distribution and treat it as the
jth parameter of the local model on the compromised worker
device. We use this Gaussian attack to show that crafting com-
promised local models randomly can not effectively attack
the Byzantine-robust aggregation rules.
2We use a pre-processed version from https://www.kaggle.com/
kmader/colorectal-histology-mnist#hmnist_64_64_L.csv.
Table 1: Default setting for key parameters.
Parameter Description Value
m Number of worker devices. 100
c Number of compromised worker devices. 20
p Degree of Non-IID. 0.5
ε Distance parameter for Krum attacks. 0.01
β Parameter of trimmed mean. c
Label flipping attack. This is a data poisoning attack that
does not require knowledge of the training data distribution.
On each compromised worker device, this attack flips the
label of each training instance. Specifically, we flip a label l as
L− l−1, where L is the number of classes in the classification
problem and l = 0,1, · · · ,L−1.
Back-gradient optimization based attack [43]. This is
the state-of-the-art untargeted data poisoning attack for multi-
class classifiers. We note that this attack is not scalable and
thus we compare our attacks with this attack on a subset of
MNIST separately. The results are shown in Section 4.4.
Full knowledge attack or partial knowledge attack. Our
attack when the attacker knows the local models on all worker
devices or the compromised ones.
Parameter setting: We describe parameter setting for the
federated learning algorithms and our attacks. Table 1 sum-
marizes the default setting for key parameters. We use
MXNet [12] to implement federated learning and attacks.
We repeat each experiment for 50 trials and report the average
results. We observed that the variances are very small, so we
omit them for simplicity.
Federated learning algorithms. By default, we assume
m = 100 worker devices; each worker device applies one
round of stochastic gradient descent to update its local model;
and the master device aggregates local models from all worker
devices. One unique characteristic of federated learning is
that the local training datasets on different devices may not be
independently and identically distributed (i.e., non-IID) [39].
We simulate federated learning with different non-IID training
data distributions. Suppose we have L classes in the classifica-
tion problem, e.g., L= 10 for the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST
datasets, and L = 8 for the CH-MNIST dataset. We evenly
split the worker devices into L groups. We model non-IID
federated learning by assigning a training instance with label
l to the lth group with probability p, where p > 0. A higher
p indicates a higher degree of non-IID. For convenience, we
call the probability p degree of non-IID. Unless otherwise
mentioned, we set p = 0.5.
We set 500 iterations for the LR classifier on MNIST; we
set 2,000 iterations for the DNN classifiers on all four datasets;
and we set the batch size to be 32 in stochastic gradient de-
scent, except that we set the batch size to be 64 for Fashion-
MNIST as such setting leads to a more accurate model. The
trimmed mean aggregation rule prunes the largest and small-
est β parameters, where c≤ β< m2 . Pruning more parameters
Table 2: Testing error rates of various attacks.
(a) LR classifier, MNIST
NoAttack Gaussian LabelFlip Partial Full
Krum 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.72 0.80
Trimmed mean 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.23 0.52
Median 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.29
(b) DNN classifier, MNIST
NoAttack Gaussian LabelFlip Partial Full
Krum 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.75 0.77
Trimmed mean 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.23
Median 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.32
(c) DNN classifier, Fashion-MNIST
NoAttack Gaussian LabelFlip Partial Full
Krum 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.90 0.91
Trimmed mean 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.26 0.28
Median 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.21 0.29
(d) DNN classifier, CH-MNIST
NoAttack Gaussian LabelFlip Partial Full
Krum 0.29 0.30 0.43 0.73 0.81
Trimmed mean 0.17 0.25 0.37 0.69 0.69
Median 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.57 0.63
(e) DNN classifier, Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic)
NoAttack Gaussian LabelFlip Partial Full
Krum 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.17 0.17
Trimmed mean 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.15
Median 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.18
leads to larger testing error rates without attacks. By default,
we consider β= c as the authors of trimmed mean did [66].
Our attacks. Unless otherwise mentioned, we consider 20
worker devices are compromised. Our attacks to Krum have
a parameter ε, which is related to the distance between the
crafted compromised local models. We set ε= 0.01 (we will
study the impact of ε on our attack). We do not set ε = 0
because ε= 0 makes the c compromised local models exactly
the same, making the compromised local models easily de-
tected by the master device. Our attacks to trimmed mean and
median have a parameter b in the full knowledge scenario,
where b > 1. Our attacks do not depend on b once b > 1.
We set b = 2. Unless otherwise mentioned, we assume that
attacker manipulates the local models on the compromised
worker devices in each iteration.
4.2 Results for Known Aggregation Rule
Our attacks are effective: Table 2 shows the testing error
rates of the compared attacks on the four datasets. First, these
results show that our attacks are effective and substantially
outperform existing attacks, i.e., our attacks result in higher er-
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Figure 2: Testing error rates for different attacks as we have more compromised worker devices on MNIST. (a)-(c): LR classifier
and (d)-(f): DNN classifier.
ror rates. For instance, when dataset is MNIST, classifier is LR,
and aggregation rule is Krum, our partial knowledge attack in-
creases the error rate from 0.14 to 0.72 (around 400% relative
increase). Gaussian attacks only increase the error rates in sev-
eral cases, e.g., median aggregation rule for Fashion-MNIST,
and trimmed mean and median for CH-MNIST. Label flip-
ping attacks can increase the error rates for DNN classifiers
in some cases but have limited success for LR classifiers.
Second, Krum is less robust to our attacks than trimmed
mean and median, except on Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Di-
agnostic) where Krum is comparable to median. A possible
reason why trimmed mean and median outperform Krum is
that Krum picks one local model as the global model, while
trimmed mean and median aggregate multiple local models to
update the global model (the median selects one local model
parameter for each model parameter, but the selected parame-
ters may be from different local models). Trimmed mean is
more robust to our attacks in some cases while median is more
robust in other cases. Third, we observe that the error rates
may depend on the data dimension. For instance, MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST have 784 dimensions, CH-MNIST has 4096
dimensions, and Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic) has
30 dimensions. For the DNN classifiers, the error rates are
higher on CH-MNIST than on other datasets in most cases,
while the error rates are lower on Breast Cancer Wisconsin
(Diagnostic) than on other datasets in most cases.
We note that federated learning may have higher error rate
than centralized learning, even if robustness feature is not
considered (i.e., mean aggregation rule is used). For instance,
the DNN classifiers respectively achieve testing error rates
0.01, 0.08, 0.07, and 0.01 in centralized learning on the four
datasets, while they respectively achieve testing error rates
0.04, 0.09, 0.09, and 0.01 in federated learning with the mean
aggregation rule on the four datasets. However, in the sce-
narios where users’ training data can only be stored on their
edge/mobile devices, e.g., for privacy purposes, centralized
learning is not applicable and federated learning may be the
only option even though its error rate is higher. Compared to
the mean aggregation rule, Byzantine-robust aggregation rule
increases the error rate without attacks. However, if Byzantine-
robust aggregation rule is not used, a single malicious device
can make the learnt global model totally useless [9, 66]. To
summarize, in the scenarios where users’ training data can
only be stored on their edge/mobile devices and there may
exist attacks, Byzantine-robust federated learning may be the
best option, even if its error rate is higher.
Impact of the percentage of compromised worker de-
vices: Figure 2 shows the error rates of different attacks
as the percentage of compromised worker devices increases
on MNIST. Our attacks increase the error rates significantly
as we compromise more worker devices; label flipping only
slightly increases the error rates; and Gaussian attacks have
no notable impact on the error rates. Two exceptions are that
Krum’s error rates decrease when the percentage of compro-
mised worker devices increases from 5% to 10% in Figure 2a
and from 10% to 15% in Figure 2d. We suspect the reason is
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Figure 3: Testing error rates for different attacks as we increase the degree of non-IID on MNIST. (a)-(c): LR classifier and
(d)-(f): DNN classifier.
that Krum selects one local model as a global model in each
iteration. We have similar observations on the other datasets.
Therefore, we omit the corresponding results for simplicity.
Impact of the degree of non-IID in federated learn-
ing: Figure 3 shows the error rates for the compared attacks
for different degrees of non-IID on MNIST. Error rates of
all attacks including no attacks increase as we increase the
degree of non-IID, except that the error rates of our attacks to
Krum fluctuate as the degree of non-IID increases. A possible
reason is that as the local training datasets on different worker
devices are more non-IID, the local models are more diverse,
leaving more room for attacks. For instance, an extreme ex-
ample is that if the local models on the benign worker devices
are the same, it would be harder to attack the aggregation
rules, because their aggregated model would be more likely
to depend on the benign local models.
Impact of different parameter settings of federated learn-
ing algorithms: We study the impact of various parame-
ters in federated learning including the number of rounds
of stochastic gradient descent each worker device performs,
number of worker devices, number of worker devices selected
to update the global model in each iteration, and β in trimmed
mean. In these experiments, we use MNIST and the LR clas-
sifier for simplicity. Unless otherwise mentioned, we consider
median, as median is more robust than Krum and does not
require configuring extra parameters (trimmed mean requires
configuring β). Moreover, for simplicity, we consider partial
knowledge attacks as they are more practical.
Worker devices can perform multiple rounds of stochastic
gradient descent to update their local models. Figure 4a shows
the impact of the number of rounds on the testing error rates
of our attack. The testing error rates decrease as we use more
rounds of stochastic gradient descent for both no attack and
our partial knowledge attack. This is because more rounds
of stochastic gradient descent lead to more accurate local
models, and the local models on different worker devices
are less diverse, leaving a smaller attack space. However, our
attack still increases the error rates substantially even if we use
more rounds. For instance, our attack still increases the error
rate by more than 30% when using 10 rounds of stochastic
gradient descent. We note that a large number of rounds result
in large computational cost for worker devices, which may be
unacceptable for resource-constrained devices such as mobile
phones and IoT devices.
Figure 4b shows the testing error rates of our attack as the
number of worker devices increases, where 20% of worker
devices are compromised. Our attack is more effective (i.e.,
testing error rate is larger) as the federated learning system
involves more worker devices. We found a possible reason
is that our partial knowledge attacks can more accurately
estimate the changing directions with more worker devices.
For instance, for trimmed mean of the DNN classifier on
MNIST, our partial knowledge attacks can correctly estimate
the changing directions of 72% of the global model param-
eters on average when there are 50 worker devices, and this
fraction increases to 76% when there are 100 worker devices.
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Figure 4: (a) Impact of the number of rounds of stochastic gradient descent worker devices use to update their local models in
each iteration on our attacks. (b) Impact of the number of worker devices on our attacks. (c) Impact of the number of worker
devices selected in each iteration on our attacks. MNIST, LR classifier, and median are used.
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Figure 5: (a) Testing error rates of the trimmed mean aggregation rule when using different β. (b) Testing error rates of the Krum
aggregation rule when our attack uses different ε. (c) Testing error rates of the median aggregation rule when our attacks poison a
certain fraction of randomly selected iterations of federated learning. MNIST and LR classifier are used.
In federated learning [39], the master device could ran-
domly sample some worker devices and send the global model
to them; the sampled worker devices update their local mod-
els and send the updated local models to the master device;
and the master device updates the global model using the
local models from the sampled worker devices. Figure 4c
shows the impact of the number of worker devices selected in
each iteration on the testing error rates of our attack, where
the total number of worker devices is 100. Since the master
device randomly selects a subset of worker devices in each
iteration, a smaller number of compromised worker devices
are selected in some iterations, while a larger number of com-
promised worker devices are selected in other iterations. On
average, among the selected worker devices, cm of them are
compromised ones, where c is the total number of compro-
mised worker devices and m is the total number of worker
devices. Our Figure 2 shows that our attacks become effective
when cm is larger than 10%-15%. Note that an attacker can
inject a large number of fake devices to a federated learning
system, so cm can be large.
The trimmed mean aggregation rule has a parameter β,
which should be at least the number of compromised worker
devices. Figure 5a shows the testing error rates of no attack
and our partial knowledge attack as β increases. Roughly
speaking, our attack is less effective (i.e., testing error rates
are smaller) as more local model parameters are trimmed.
This is because our crafted local model parameters on the
compromised worker devices are more likely to be trimmed
when the master device trims more local model parameters.
However, the testing error of no attack also slightly increases
as β increases. The reason is that more benign local model
parameters are trimmed and the mean of the remaining local
model parameters becomes less accurate. The master device
may be motivated to use a smaller β to guarantee performance
when there are no attacks.
Impact of the parameter ε in our attacks to Krum: Fig-
ure 5b shows the error rates of the Krum aggregation rule
when our attacks use different ε, where MNIST dataset and
LR classifier are considered. We observe that our attacks
can effectively increase the error rates using a wide range
of ε. Moreover, our attacks achieve larger error rates when ε
is smaller. This is because when ε is smaller, the distances
between the compromised local models are smaller, which
makes it more likely for Krum to select the local model crafted
by our attack as the global model.
Impact of the number of poisoned iterations: Figure 5c
shows the error rates of the median aggregation rule when our
attacks poison the local models on the compromised worker
Table 3: Testing error rates of attacks on the DNN classifier
for MNIST when the master device chooses the global model
with the lowest testing error rate.
NoAttack Gaussian LabelFlip Partial Full
Krum 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.69 0.70
Trimmed mean 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.18
Median 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.32
devices in a certain fraction of randomly selected iterations
of federated learning. Unsurprisingly, the error rate increases
when poisoning more iterations.
Alternative training strategy: Each iteration results in a
global model. Instead of selecting the last global model as
the final model, an alternative training strategy is to select
the global model that has the lowest testing error rate.3 Ta-
ble 3 shows the testing error rates of various attacks on the
DNN classifier for MNIST, when such alternative training
strategy is adopted. In these experiments, our attacks attack
each iteration of federated learning, and the column “NoAt-
tack” corresponds to the scenarios where no iterations are
attacked. Compared to Table 2b, this alternative training strat-
egy is slightly more secure against our attacks. However, our
attacks are still effective. For instance, for the Krum, trimmed
mean, and median aggregation rules, our partial knowledge
attacks still increase the testing error rates by 590%, 100%,
and 83%, respectively. Another training strategy is to roll
back to a few iterations ago if the master device detects an
unusual increase of training error rate. However, such training
strategy is not applicable because the training error rates of
the global models still decrease until convergence when we
perform our attacks in each iteration. In other words, there
are no unusual increases of training error rates.
4.3 Results for Unknown Aggregation Rule
We craft local models based on one aggregation rule and show
the attack effectiveness for other aggregation rules. Table 4
shows the transferability between aggregation rules, where
MNIST and LR classifier are considered. We observe different
levels of transferability between aggregation rules. Specifi-
cally, Krum based attack can well transfer to trimmed mean
and median, e.g., Krum based attack increases the error rate
from 0.12 to 0.15 (25% relative increase) for trimmed mean,
and from 0.13 to 0.18 (38% relative increase) for median.
Trimmed mean based attack does not transfer to Krum but
transfers to median well. For instance, trimmed mean based
attack increases the error rates from 0.13 to 0.20 (54% relative
increase) for median.
3We give advantages to the alternative training strategy since we use
testing error rate to select the global model.
Table 4: Transferability between aggregation rules. “Krum
attack” and “Trimmed mean attack” mean that we craft the
compromised local models based on the Krum and trimmed
mean aggregation rules, respectively. Partial knowledge at-
tacks are considered. The numbers are testing error rates.
Krum Trimmed mean Median
No attack 0.14 0.12 0.13
Krum attack 0.70 0.15 0.18
Trimmed mean attack 0.14 0.25 0.20
4.4 Comparing with Back-gradient Optimiza-
tion based Attack
Back-gradient optimization based attack (BGA) [43] is state-
of-the-art untargeted data poisoning attack for multi-class clas-
sifiers such as multi-class LR and DNN. BGA formulates a
bilevel optimization problem, where the inner optimization is
to minimize the training loss on the poisoned training data and
the outer optimization is to find poisoning examples that maxi-
mize the minimal training loss in the inner optimization. BGA
iteratively finds the poisoned examples by alternately solving
the inner minimization and outer maximization problems. We
implemented BGA and verified that our implementation can
reproduce the results reported by the authors. However, BGA
is not scalable to the entire MNIST dataset. Therefore, we
uniformly sample 6,000 training examples in MNIST, and
we learn a 10-class LR classifier. Moreover, we assume 100
worker devices, randomly distribute the 6,000 examples to
them, and assume 20 worker devices are compromised.
Generating poisoned data: We assume an attacker has full
knowledge about the training datasets on all worker devices.
Therefore, the attacker can use BGA to generate poisoned
data based on the 6,000 examples. In particular, we run the
attack for 10 days on a GTX 1080Ti GPU, which generates
240 (240/6000 = 4%) poisoned examples. We verified that
these poisoned data can effectively increase the testing error
rate if the LR classifier is learnt in a centralized environment.
In particular, the poisoned data can increase the testing error
rate of the LR classifier from 0.10 to 0.16 (60% relative in-
crease) in centralized learning. However, in federated learning,
the attacker can only inject the poisoned data to the compro-
mised worker devices. We consider two scenarios on how
the attacker distributes the poisoned data to the compromised
worker devices:
Single worker. In this scenario, the attacker distributes the
poisoned data on a single compromised worker device.
Uniform distribution. In this scenario, the attacker dis-
tributes the poisoned data to the compromised worker devices
uniformly at random.
We consider the two scenarios because they represent two
extremes for distributing data (concentrated or evenly dis-
tributed) and we expect one extreme to maximize attack effec-
tiveness. Table 5 compares BGA with our attacks. We observe
Table 5: Testing error rates of back-gradient optimization
based attacks (SingleWorker and Uniform) and our attacks
(Partial and Full).
NoAttack SingleWorker Uniform Partial Full
Mean 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.54 0.69
Krum 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.85 0.89
Trimmed mean 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.27 0.32
Median 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.21
that BGA has limited success at attacking Byzantine-robust
aggregation rules, while our attacks can substantially increase
the testing error rates. We note that if the federated learning
uses the mean aggregation rule BGA is still successful. For
instance, when the mean aggregation rule is used, BGA can
increase the testing error rate by 50% when distributing the
poisoned data to the compromised worker devices uniformly
at random. However, when applying our attacks for trimmed
mean to attack the mean aggregation rule, we can increase the
testing error rates substantially more (see the last two cells in
the second row of Table 5).
5 Defenses
We generalize RONI [4] and TRIM [30], which were designed
to defend against data poisoning attacks, to defend against
our local model poisoning attacks. Both generalized defenses
remove the local models that are potentially malicious before
computing the global model in each iteration of federated
learning. One generalized defense removes the local models
that have large negative impact on the error rate of the global
model (inspired by RONI that removes training examples that
have large negative impact on the error rate of the model),
while the other defense removes the local models that result
in large loss (inspired by TRIM that removes the training
examples that have large negative impact on the loss). In both
defenses, we assume the master device has a small validation
dataset. Like existing aggregation rules such as Krum and
trimmed mean, we assume the master device knows the upper
bound c of the number of compromised worker devices. We
note that our defenses make the global model slower to learn
and adapt to new data as that data may be identified as from
potentially malicious local models.
Error Rate based Rejection (ERR): In this defense, we
compute the impact of each local model on the error rate for
the validation dataset and remove the local models that have
large negative impact on the error rate. Specifically, suppose
we have an aggregation rule. For each local model, we use
the aggregation rule to compute a global model A when the
local model is included and a global model B when the local
model is excluded. We compute the error rates of the global
models A and B on the validation dataset, which we denote as
EA and EB, respectively. We define EA−EB as the error rate
impact of a local model. A larger error rate impact indicates
Table 6: Defense results. The numbers are testing error rates.
The columns “Krum” and “Trimmed mean” indicate the at-
tacker’s assumed aggregation rule when performing attacks,
while the rows indicate the actual aggregation rules and de-
fenses. Partial knowledge attacks are considered.
No attack Krum Trimmed mean
Krum 0.14 0.72 0.13
Krum + ERR 0.14 0.62 0.13
Krum + LFR 0.14 0.58 0.14
Krum + Union 0.14 0.48 0.14
Trimmed mean 0.12 0.15 0.23
Trimmed mean + ERR 0.12 0.17 0.21
Trimmed mean + LFR 0.12 0.18 0.12
Trimmed mean + Union 0.12 0.18 0.12
Median 0.13 0.17 0.19
Median + ERR 0.13 0.21 0.25
Median + LFR 0.13 0.20 0.13
Median + Union 0.13 0.19 0.14
that the local model increases the error rate more significantly
if we include the local model when updating the global model.
We remove the c local models that have the largest error rate
impact, and we aggregate the remaining local models to obtain
an updated global model.
Loss Function based Rejection (LFR): In this defense, we
remove local models based on their impact on the loss instead
of error rate for the validation dataset. Specifically, like the
error rate based rejection, for each local model, we compute
the global models A and B. We compute the cross-entropy
loss function values of the models A and B on the validation
dataset, which we denote as LA and LB, respectively. More-
over, we define LA−LB as the loss impact of the local model.
Like the error rate based rejection, we remove the c local
models that have the largest loss impact, and we aggregate
the remaining local models to update the global model.
Union (i.e., ERR+LFR): In this defense, we combine ERR
and LFR. Specifically, we remove the local models that are
removed by either ERR or LFR.
Defense results: Table 6 shows the defense results of ERR,
FLR, and Union, where partial knowledge attacks are con-
sidered. We use the default parameter setting discussed in
Section 4.1, e.g., 100 worker devices, 20% of compromised
worker devices, MNIST dataset, and LR classifier. Moreover,
we sample 100 testing examples uniformly at random as the
validation dataset. Each row of the table corresponds to a
defense, e.g., Krum + ERR means that the master device uses
ERR to remove the potentially malicious local models and
uses Krum as the aggregation rule. Each column indicates the
attacker’s assumed aggregation rule when performing attacks,
e.g., the column “Krum” corresponds to attacks that are based
on Krum. We have several observations.
First, LFR is comparable to ERR or much more effective
than ERR, i.e., LFR achieves similar or much smaller testing
error rates than ERR. For instance, Trimmed mean + ERR
and Trimmed mean + LFR achieve similar testing error rates
(0.17 vs. 0.18) when the attacker crafts the compromised
local models based on Krum. However, Trimmed mean +
LFR achieves a much smaller testing error rate than Trimmed
mean + ERR (0.12 vs. 0.21), when the attacker crafts the
compromised local models based on trimmed mean. Second,
Union is comparable to LFR in most cases, except one case
(Krum + LFR vs. Krum and Krum + Union vs. Krum) where
Union is more effective.
Third, LFR and Union can effectively defend against our
attacks in some cases. For instance, Trimmed mean + LFR
(or Trimmed mean + Union) achieves the same testing error
rate for both no attack and attack based on trimmed mean.
However, our attacks are still effective in other cases even if
LFR or Union is adopted. For instance, an attack, which crafts
compromised local models based on Krum, still effectively
increases the error rate from 0.14 (no attack) to 0.58 (314%
relative increase) for Krum + LFR. Fourth, the testing error
rate grows in some cases when a defense is deployed. This is
because the defenses may remove benign local models, which
increases the testing error rate of the global model.
6 Related Work
Security and privacy of federated/collaborative learning are
much less explored, compared to centralized machine learning.
Recent studies [29, 40, 44] explored privacy risks in federated
learning, which are orthogonal to our study.
Poisoning attacks: Poisoning attacks aim to compromise
the integrity of the training phase of a machine learning sys-
tem [5]. The training phase consists of two components, i.e.,
training dataset collection and learning process. Most existing
poisoning attacks compromise the training dataset collec-
tion component, e.g., inject malicious data into the training
dataset. These attacks are also known as data poisoning at-
tacks) [3, 8, 13, 19, 27, 30, 33, 43, 45, 50, 51, 56, 61, 62, 65].
Different from data poisoning attacks, our local model poi-
soning attacks compromise the learning process.
Depending on the goal of a poisoning attack, we can clas-
sify poisoning attacks into two categories, i.e., untargeted
poisoning attacks [8, 30, 33, 50, 62, 65] and targeted poison-
ing attacks [3, 6, 13, 27, 37, 45, 51, 56]. Untargeted poisoning
attacks aim to make the learnt model have a high testing error
indiscriminately for testing examples, which eventually result
in a denial-of-service attack. In targeted poisoning attacks, the
learnt model produces attacker-desired predictions for particu-
lar testing examples, e.g., predicting spams as non-spams and
predicting attacker-desired labels for testing examples with a
particular trojan trigger (these attacks are also known as back-
door/trojan attacks [27]). However, the testing error for other
testing examples is unaffected. Our local model poisoning
attacks are untargeted poisoning attacks. Different from exist-
ing untargeted poisoning attacks that focus on centralized ma-
chine learning, our attacks are optimized for Byzantine-robust
federated learning. We note that Xie et al. [63] proposed in-
ner product manipulation based untargeted poisoning attacks
to Byzantine-robust federated learning including Krum and
median, which is concurrent to our work.
Defenses: Existing defenses were mainly designed for data
poisoning attacks to centralized machine learning. They es-
sentially aim to detect the injected malicious data in the train-
ing dataset. One category of defenses [4, 15, 56, 59] detects
malicious data based on their (negative) impact on the per-
formance of the learnt model. For instance, Barreno et al. [4]
proposed Reject on Negative Impact (RONI), which measures
the impact of each training example on the performance of
the learnt model and removes the training examples that have
large negative impact. Suciu et al. [56] proposed a variant of
RONI (called tRONI) for targeted poisoning attacks. In par-
ticular, tRONI measures the impact of a training example on
only the target classification and excludes training examples
that have large impact.
Another category of defenses [20, 30, 35, 55] proposed new
loss functions, optimizing which obtains model parameters
and detects the injected malicious data simultaneously. For
instance, Jagielski et al. [30] proposed TRIM, which aims
to jointly find a subset of training dataset with a given size
and model parameters that minimize the loss function. The
training examples that are not in the selected subset are treated
as malicious data. These defenses are not directly applicable
for our local model poisoning attacks because our attacks do
not inject malicious data into the training dataset.
For federated learning, the machine learning community
recently proposed several aggregation rules (e.g., Krum [9],
Bulyan [42], trimmed mean [66], median [66], and others [14])
that were claimed to be robust against Byzantine failures of
certain worker devices. Our work shows that these defenses
are not effective in practice against our optimized local model
poisoning attacks that carefully craft local models on the
compromised worker devices. Fung et al. [23] proposed to
compute weight for each worker device according to histori-
cal local models and take the weighted average of the local
models to update the global model. However, their method
can only defend against label flipping attacks, which can al-
ready be defended by existing Byzantine-robust aggregation
rules. We propose ERR and LFR, which are respectively gen-
eralized from RONI and TRIM, to defend against our local
model poisoning attacks. We find that these defenses are not
effective enough in some scenarios, highlighting the needs of
new defenses against our attacks.
Other security and privacy threats to machine learn-
ing: Adversarial examples [5, 57] aim to make a machine
learning system predict labels as an attacker desires via adding
carefully crafted noise to normal testing examples in the test-
ing phase. Various methods (e.g., [2, 11, 25, 36, 46, 47, 52,
54, 57]) were proposed to generate adversarial examples, and
many defenses (e.g., [10,25,26,38,41,48,64]) were explored
to mitigate them. Different from poisoning attacks, adversarial
examples compromise the testing phase of machine learning.
Both poisoning attacks and adversarial examples compro-
mise the integrity of machine learning. An attacker could also
compromise the confidentiality of machine learning. Specif-
ically, an attacker could compromise the confidentiality of
users’ private training or testing data via various attacks such
as model inversion attacks [21, 22], membership inference
attacks [40, 49, 53], and property inference attacks [1, 24].
Moreover, an attacker could also compromise the confiden-
tiality/intellectual property of a model provider via stealing
its model parameters and hyperparameters [34, 58, 60].
7 Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work
We demonstrate that the federated learning methods, which
the machine learning community claimed to be robust against
Byzantine failures of some worker devices, are vulnerable to
our local model poisoning attacks that manipulate the local
models sent from the compromised worker devices to the
master device during the learning process. In particular, to
increase the error rates of the learnt global models, an attacker
can craft the local models on the compromised worker de-
vices such that the aggregated global model deviates the most
towards the inverse of the direction along which the global
model would change when there are no attacks. Moreover,
finding such crafted local models can be formulated as op-
timization problems. We can generalize existing defenses
for data poisoning attacks to defend against our local model
poisoning attacks. Such generalized defenses are effective in
some cases but are not effective enough in other cases. Our
results highlight that we need new defenses to defend against
our local model poisoning attacks.
Our work is limited to untargeted poisoning attacks. It
would be interesting to study targeted poisoning attacks to
federated learning. Moreover, it is valuable future work to de-
sign new defenses against our local model poisoning attacks,
e.g., new methods to detect compromised local models and
new adversarially robust aggregation rules.
8 Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers and our shepherd Nikita
Borisov for constructive reviews and comments. This work
was supported by NSF grant No.1937786.
References
[1] Giuseppe Ateniese, Luigi V Mancini, Angelo Spognardi,
Antonio Villani, Domenico Vitali, and Giovanni Felici.
Hacking smart machines with smarter ones: How to ex-
tract meaningful data from machine learning classifiers.
International Journal of Security and Networks, 10(3),
2015.
[2] Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, and
Kevin Kwok. Synthesizing robust adversarial exam-
ples. In ICML, 2018.
[3] Eugene Bagdasaryan, Andreas Veit, Yiqing Hua, Deb-
orah Estrin, and Vitaly Shmatikov. How to backdoor
federated learning. In arxiv, 2018.
[4] Marco Barreno, Blaine Nelson, Anthony D Joseph, and
JD Tygar. The security of machine learning. Machine
Learning, 2010.
[5] Marco Barreno, Blaine Nelson, Russell Sears, An-
thony D Joseph, and J Doug Tygar. Can machine learn-
ing be secure? In ACM ASIACCS, 2006.
[6] Arjun Bhagoji, Supriyo Chakraborty, Prateek Mittal, and
Seraphin Calo. Analyzing federated learning through
an adversarial lens. In ICML, 2019.
[7] Battista Biggio, Luca Didaci, Giorgio Fumera, and Fabio
Roli. Poisoning attacks to compromise face templates.
In IEEE ICB, 2013.
[8] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. Poi-
soning attacks against support vector machines. In
ICML, 2012.
[9] Peva Blanchard, El Mahdi El Mhamdi, Rachid Guer-
raoui, and Julien Stainer. Machine learning with adver-
saries: Byzantine tolerant gradient descent. In NIPS,
2017.
[10] Xiaoyu Cao and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. Mitigating eva-
sion attacks to deep neural networks via region-based
classification. In ACSAC, 2017.
[11] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluating
the robustness of neural networks. In IEEE S & P, 2017.
[12] Tianqi Chen, Mu Li, Yutian Li, Min Lin, Naiyan Wang,
Minjie Wang, Tianjun Xiao, Bing Xu, Chiyuan Zhang,
and Zheng Zhang. Mxnet: A flexible and efficient ma-
chine learning library for heterogeneous distributed sys-
tems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.01274, 2015.
[13] Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, Bo Li, Kimberly Lu, and
Dawn Song. Targeted backdoor attacks on deep learning
systems using data poisoning. In arxiv, 2017.
[14] Yudong Chen, Lili Su, and Jiaming Xu. Distributed sta-
tistical machine learning in adversarial settings: Byzan-
tine gradient descent. In POMACS, 2017.
[15] Gabriela F. Cretu, Angelos Stavrou, Michael E. Locasto,
Salvatore J. Stolfo, and Angelos D. Keromytis. Cast-
ing out demons: Sanitizing training data for anomaly
sensors. In IEEE S & P, 2008.
[16] Jeffrey Dean, Greg S. Corrado, Rajat Monga, Kai
Chen, Matthieu Devin, Quoc V. Le, Mark Z. Mao,
Marc’Aurelio Ranzato, Andrew Senior, Paul Tucker,
Ke Yang, and Andrew Y. Ng. Large scale distributed
deep networks. In NIPS, 2012.
[17] John R. Douceur. The Sybil attack. In IPTPS, 2002.
[18] Dheeru Dua and Casey Graff. UCI machine learning
repository, 2017.
[19] Minghong Fang, Guolei Yang, Neil Zhenqiang Gong,
and Jia Liu. Poisoning attacks to graph-based recom-
mender systems. In ACSAC, 2018.
[20] Jiashi Feng, Huan Xu, Shie Mannor, and Shuicheng Yan.
Robust logistic regression and classification. In NIPS,
2014.
[21] Matt Fredrikson, Somesh Jha, and Thomas Ristenpart.
Model inversion attacks that exploit confidence informa-
tion and basic countermeasures. In ACM CCS, 2015.
[22] Matthew Fredrikson, Eric Lantz, Somesh Jha, Simon
Lin, David Page, and Thomas Ristenpart. Privacy in
pharmacogenetics: An end-to-end case study of person-
alized warfarin dosing. In USENIX Security Symposium,
2014.
[23] Clement Fung, Chris J.M. Yoon, and Ivan Beschastnikh.
Mitigating sybils in federated learning poisoning. In
arxiv, 2018.
[24] Karan Ganju, Qi Wang, Wei Yang, Carl A. Gunter, and
Nikita Borisov. Property inference attacks on fully con-
nected neural networks using permutation invariant rep-
resentations. In CCS, 2018.
[25] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian
Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial exam-
ples. arXiv, 2014.
[26] Kathrin Grosse, Praveen Manoharan, Nicolas Papernot,
Michael Backes, and Patrick McDaniel. On the (sta-
tistical) detection of adversarial examples. In arXiv,
2017.
[27] Tianyu Gu, Brendan Dolan-Gavitt, and Siddharth Garg.
Badnets: Identifying vulnerabilities in the machine
learning model supply chain. In Machine Learning
and Computer Security Workshop, 2017.
[28] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian
Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition. In
CVPR, pages 770–778, 2016.
[29] Briland Hitaj, Giuseppe Ateniese, and Fernando Perez-
Cruz. Deep models under the gan: Information leakage
from collaborative deep learning. In CCS, 2017.
[30] Matthew Jagielski, Alina Oprea, Battista Biggio, Chang
Liu, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, and Bo Li. Manipulating ma-
chine learning: Poisoning attacks and countermeasures
for regression learning. In IEEE S & P, 2018.
[31] Jakob Nikolas Kather, Cleo-Aron Weis, Francesco Bian-
coni, Susanne M Melchers, Lothar R Schad, Timo
Gaiser, Alexander Marx, and Frank Gerrit Zöllner.
Multi-class texture analysis in colorectal cancer histol-
ogy. Scientific reports, 2016.
[32] Jakub Konecˇný, H. Brendan McMahan, Felix X. Yu,
Peter Richtárik, Ananda Theertha Suresh, and Dave Ba-
con. Federated learning: Strategies for improving com-
munication efficiency. In NIPS Workshop on Private
Multi-Party Machine Learning, 2016.
[33] Bo Li, Yining Wang, Aarti Singh, and Yevgeniy Vorob-
eychik. Data poisoning attacks on factorization-based
collaborative filtering. In NIPS, 2016.
[34] Bin Liang, Miaoqiang Su, Wei You, Wenchang Shi, and
Gang Yang. Cracking classifiers for evasion: A case
study on the google’s phishing pages filter. In ACM
WWW, 2016.
[35] Chang Liu, Bo Li, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, and Alina
Oprea. Robust linear regression against training data
poisoning. In AISec, 2017.
[36] Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song.
Delving into transferable adversarial examples and
black-box attacks. In ICLR, 2017.
[37] Yingqi Liu, Shiqing Ma, Yousra Aafer, Wen-Chuan Lee,
Juan Zhai, Weihang Wang, and Xiangyu Zhang. Trojan-
ing attack on neural networks. In NDSS, 2018.
[38] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig
Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
[39] H. Brendan McMahan, Eider Moore, Daniel Ram-
age, Seth Hampson, and Blaise Agüera y Arcas.
Communication-efficient learning of deep networks
from decentralized data. In AISTATS, 2017.
[40] Luca Melis, Congzheng Song, Emiliano De Cristofaro,
and Vitaly Shmatikov. Exploiting unintended feature
leakage in collaborative learning. In IEEE S & P, 2019.
[41] Jan Hendrik Metzen, Tim Genewein, Volker Fischer, and
Bastian Bischof. On detecting adversarial perturbations.
In ICLR, 2017.
[42] El Mahdi El Mhamdi, Rachid Guerraoui, and Sébastien
Rouault. The hidden vulnerability of distributed learning
in byzantium. In ICML, 2018.
[43] Luis Muñoz-González, Battista Biggio, Ambra Demon-
tis, Andrea Paudice, Vasin Wongrassamee, Emil C Lupu,
and Fabio Roli. Towards poisoning of deep learning al-
gorithms with back-gradient optimization. In AISec,
2017.
[44] Milad Nasr, Reza Shokri, and Amir Houmansadr. Com-
prehensive privacy analysis of deep learning: Stand-
alone and federated learning under passive and active
white-box inference attacks. In IEEE S & P, 2019.
[45] B. Nelson, M. Barreno, F. J. Chi, A. D. Joseph, B. I. P.
Rubinstein, U. Saini, C. Sutton, J. D. Tygar, and K. Xia.
Exploiting machine learning to subvert your spam filter.
In LEET, 2008.
[46] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Ian Goodfellow,
Somesh Jha, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami.
Practical black-box attacks against machine learning. In
ACM ASIACCS, 2017.
[47] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt
Fredrikson, Z. Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami.
The limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings.
In EuroS&P, 2016.
[48] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Xi Wu, Somesh
Jha, and Ananthram Swami. Distillation as a defense to
adversarial perturbations against deep neural networks.
In IEEE S & P, 2016.
[49] Apostolos Pyrgelis, Carmela Troncoso, and Emiliano De
Cristofaro. Knock knock, who’s there? membership
inference on aggregate location data. In NDSS, 2018.
[50] Benjamin IP Rubinstein, Blaine Nelson, Ling Huang,
Anthony D Joseph, Shing-hon Lau, Satish Rao, Nina
Taft, and JD Tygar. Antidote: understanding and defend-
ing against poisoning of anomaly detectors. In ACM
IMC, 2009.
[51] Ali Shafahi, W Ronny Huang, Mahyar Najibi, Octavian
Suciu, Christoph Studer, Tudor Dumitras, and Tom Gold-
stein. Poison frogs! targeted clean-label poisoning at-
tacks on neural networks. In NIPS, 2018.
[52] Mahmood Sharif, Sruti Bhagavatula, Lujo Bauer, and
K Michael Reiter. Accessorize to a crime: Real and
stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition. In
ACM CCS, 2016.
[53] Reza Shokri, Marco Stronati, Congzheng Song, and Vi-
taly Shmatikov. Membership inference attacks against
machine learning models. In IEEE S & P, 2017.
[54] Nedim Srndic and Pavel Laskov. Practical evasion of a
learning-based classifier: A case study. In IEEE S & P,
2014.
[55] Jacob Steinhardt, Pang Wei Koh, and Percy Liang. Certi-
fied defenses for data poisoning attacks. In NIPS, 2017.
[56] Octavian Suciu, Radu Marginean, Yigitcan Kaya,
Hal Daume III, and Tudor Dumitras. When does ma-
chine learning fail? generalized transferability for eva-
sion and poisoning attacks. In Usenix Security Sympo-
sium, 2018.
[57] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever,
Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob
Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv,
2013.
[58] Florian Tramèr, Fan Zhang, Ari Juels, Michael K Reiter,
and Thomas Ristenpart. Stealing machine learning mod-
els via prediction apis. In USENIX Security Symposium,
2016.
[59] Brandon Tran, Jerry Li, and Aleksander Madry. Spectral
signatures in backdoor attacks. In NIPS, 2018.
[60] Binghui Wang and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. Stealing
hyperparameters in machine learning. In IEEE S & P,
2018.
[61] Binghui Wang and Neil Zhenqiang Gong. Attacking
graph-based classification via manipulating the graph
structure. In CCS, 2019.
[62] Huang Xiao, Battista Biggio, Gavin Brown, Giorgio
Fumera, Claudia Eckert, and Fabio Roli. Is feature se-
lection secure against training data poisoning? In ICML,
2015.
[63] Cong Xie, Sanmi Koyejo, and Indranil Gupta. Fall of
empires: Breaking byzantine-tolerant sgd by inner prod-
uct manipulation. In UAI, 2019.
[64] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi. Feature squeez-
ing: Detecting adversarial examples in deep neural net-
works. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155, 2017.
[65] Guolei Yang, Neil Zhenqiang Gong, and Ying Cai. Fake
co-visitation injection attacks to recommender systems.
In NDSS, 2017.
[66] Dong Yin, Yudong Chen, Kannan Ramchandran, and
Peter Bartlett. Byzantine-robust distributed learning:
Towards optimal statistical rates. In ICML, 2018.
Table 7: (a) The DNN architecture (input layer is not shown)
used for MNIST and Fashion MNIST. (b) Testing error rates
when applying attacks for Krum to attack Bulyan.
(a)
Layer Type Size
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×30
Max Pooling 2×2
Convolution + ReLU 3×3×50
Max Pooling 2×2
Fully Connected + ReLU 200
Softmax 10 / 8
(b)
Bulyan
No attack 0.14
Partial Knowledge 0.36
Full Knowledge 0.38
Table 8: Testing error rates of our attacks based on the devia-
tion goal and directed deviation goal.
Krum Trimmed mean Median
Deviation goal 0.87 0.10 0.12
Directed deviation goal 0.80 0.52 0.29
A Attacking Bulyan
Bulyan is based on Krum. We apply our attacks for Krum to
attack Bulyan. Table 7b shows results of attacking Bulyan.
The dataset is MNIST, the classifier is logistic regression,
m = 100, c = 20, θ= m−2c (Bulyan selects θ local models
using Krum), and γ = θ− 2c (Bulyan takes the mean of γ
parameters). Our results show that our attacks to Krum can
transfer to Bulyan. Specifically, our partial knowledge attack
increases the error rate by around 150%, while our full knowl-
edge attack increases the error rate by 165%.
B Deviation Goal
The deviation goal is to craft local models w′1,w
′
2, · · · ,w′c for
the compromised worker devices via solving the following
optimization problem in each iteration:
max
w′1,··· ,w′c
||w−w′||1,
subject to w = A(w1, · · · ,wc,wc+1, · · · ,wm),
w′ = A(w′1, · · · ,w′c,wc+1, · · · ,wm), (5)
where || · ||1 is L1 norm. We can adapt our attacks based on the
directed deviation goal to the deviation goal. For simplicity,
we focus on the full knowledge scenario.
Krum: Similar to the directed deviation goal, we make two
approximations, i.e., w′1 =wRe−λ and the c compromised lo-
cal models are the same. Then, we formulate an optimization
problem similar to Equation 2, except that w′1 = wRe−λs is
changed to w′1 = wRe−λ. Like Theorem 1, we can derive an
upper bound of λ, given which we use binary search to solve
λ. After solving λ, we obtain w′1. Then, we randomly sample
c− 1 vectors whose Euclidean distances to w′1 are smaller
than ε as the other c−1 compromised local models.
Trimmed mean: Theoretically, we can show that the follow-
ing attack can maximize the deviation of the global model: we
use any c numbers that are larger than wmax, j or smaller than
wmin, j, depending on which one makes the deviation larger, as
the jth local model parameters on the c compromised worker
devices. Like the directed deviation goal, when implementing
the attack, we randomly sample the c numbers in the inter-
val [wmax, j,b ·wmax, j] (when wmax, j > 0) or [wmax, j,wmax, j/b]
(when wmax, j ≤ 0), or in the interval [wmin, j/b,wmin, j] (when
wmin, j > 0) or [b ·wmin, j,wmin, j] (when wmin, j ≤ 0), depending
on which one makes the deviation larger.
Median: We apply the attack for trimmed mean to median.
Experimental results: Table 8 empirically compares the de-
viation goal and directed deviation goal, where MNIST and
LR classifier are used. For Krum, both goals achieve high test-
ing error rates. However, for trimmed mean and median, the
directed deviation goal achieves significantly higher testing
error rates than the deviation goal.
C Proof of Theorem 1
We denote by Γaw the set of a local models among the crafted c
compromised local models and m−c benign local models that
are the closest to the local model w with respect to Euclidean
distance. Moreover, we denote by Γ˜aw the set of a benign local
models that are the closest to w with respect to Euclidean
distance. Since w′1 is chosen by Krum, we have the following:
∑
l∈Γm−c−2
w′1
D(wl ,w′1)≤ minc+1≤i≤m ∑
l∈Γm−c−2wi
D(wl ,wi), (6)
where D(·, ·) represents Euclidean distance. The distance be-
tween w′1 and the other c− 1 compromised local models is
0, since we assume they are the same in the optimization
problem in Equation 2 when finding w′1. Therefore, we have:
∑
l∈Γ˜m−2c−1
w′1
D(wl ,w′1)≤ minc+1≤i≤m ∑
l∈Γm−c−2wi
D(wl ,wi). (7)
According to the triangle inequality D(wl ,w′1) ≥
D(w′1,wRe)−D(wl ,wRe), we get:
(m−2c−1) ·D(w′1,wRe)
≤ min
c+1≤i≤m ∑
l∈Γm−c−2wi
D(wl ,wi)+ ∑
l∈Γ˜m−2c−1
w′1
D(wl ,wRe)
≤ min
c+1≤i≤m ∑
l∈Γ˜m−c−2wi
D(wl ,wi)+(m−2c−1) · max
c+1≤i≤m
D(wi,wRe).
Since D(w′1,wRe) = ‖λ · s‖2 =
√
d ·λ, we have:
λ≤ 1
(k− c+1)√d · minc+1≤i≤m ∑l∈Γ˜kwi
D(wl ,wi)
+
1√
d
· max
c+1≤i≤m
D(wi,wRe). (8)
The bound only depends on the before-attack local models.
